Bishop v. District of Columbia: Taxation of Unincorporated Professionals\u27 Net Income Violates Home Rule by Butler, Charles
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 4 Summer 1980 Article 16 
1980 
Bishop v. District of Columbia: Taxation of Unincorporated 
Professionals' Net Income Violates Home Rule 
Charles Butler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Charles Butler, Bishop v. District of Columbia: Taxation of Unincorporated Professionals' Net Income 
Violates Home Rule , 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1033 (1980). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/16 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 




The District of Columbia Self Government and Governmental Reor-
ganization Act of 1973 (Home Rule Act)' is the product of one hundred
years of congressional debate.2 In the 1970's alone, proposals for gov-
erning the District ranged from retrocession to Maryland and Virginia3 of
all but the federal enclave to statehood for the District.4 The District to-
day has characteristics of a territory, 5 a state,6 a city-state,7 and a local
government. 8 Despite such similarities, however, the District lacks several
important powers common to most sovereignties. 9 For example, Congress
has retained the power to veto, by concurrent resolution, any legislative act
1. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 1-121 to 1-171
(1973 & Supp. V 1978)).
2. Since the first bill was introduced in the 43d Congress on June 1, 1874, more than 40
bills to provide some form of local government for the District have been introduced. The
Senate has approved seven of them, only to have them fail in the House. S. REP. No. 219,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973). See H.R. REP. No. 482, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 67-81 (1973). See
generally Newman & Depuy, Bringing Democracy to the Nation's Last Colony: The District
of Columbia Self Government Act, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 537 (1975).
3. A referendum on the retrocession proposal was originally included in the drafts of
the Home Rule legislation. HOUSE COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 93D CONG., 2D
SESS., HOME RULE FOR THE DISTICT OF COLUMBIA § 1108 at 121 (1974). See H.R. 10,693,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 33-43 (1973) (Title II - Self Government); Proposals to Retrocede Part
of District of Columbia to Maryland- Hearings on HR. 12,823, HR. 355, HR. 9881, HR.
12,922, House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 252 (1972).
4. House Comm. on the District of Columbia, Hearings on H.R. 9197 and HR. 9599,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-28 (1972).
5. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 105 (1953) (the grant
of legislative power to "all rightful subjects of legislation" is substantially identical with the
grant of legislative powers to territories). See also Home Rule Act § 302, (codified at D.C.
CODE § 1-124 (1973 & Supp. V 1978)).
6. H.R. REP. No. 482, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1973) (the Home Rule Act will expand
the District's legislative authority to that of a state).
7. 119 CONG. REC. H8715 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1973) (H.R. 9682 creates a city-state) (re-
marks of Rep. Nelson).
8. H.R. REP. No.482, 93d Cong., 1st. Sess. 1 (1973) (the purpose of the Home Rule Act
is to provide a charter for local government). See also Home Rule Act § 102, (codified at
D.C. CODE § 1-102 (1973 & Supp. V 1978)).
9. The prohibitions peculiar to the District are contained generally in Title VI of the
Home Rule Act. The specific legislative limitations are contained in § 602 of the Act. D.C.
CODE § 1-147 (1973 & Supp V. 1978).
1033
Catholic University Law Review
of the District government.'° Although to date the validity of this legisla-
tive veto power has not been seriously challenged in the courts," another
significant limitation upon the District's legislative power has already en-
gendered considerable legal controversy.
Section 602(a)5 of the Home Rule Act prohibits the District from impos-
ing "any tax on the whole or any portion of the personal income, either
directly or at the source thereof, of any individual not a resident of the
District . . 12 Unable to tax the personal income of nonresidents, the
District has sought to expand its revenue base by broadening the applica-
bility of local taxes not prohibited by the Home Rule Act. 13 One such tax
is the District of Columbia Unincorporated Business (DCUB) tax.' 4 As
enacted by the Congress in 1947, the DCUB tax is on the privilege of do-
ing business' 5 or receiving income from sources within the District.' 6 It
10. D.C. CODE § 1-127 (1973 & Supp. V 1978). As a result, two separate legislative
bodies, the city council and Congress, review the substantive merits of the proposed legisla-
tion. The effect is to give groups opposed to particular legislation two opportunities to
thwart its passage: once before the city council and again before Congress. There are, how-
ever, exceptions to the congressional veto provisions. For example, § 602(c)1 provides that
acts which come under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1
(1976), the 90 day "emergency circumstances" exception of § 412(a), and proposals to
amend the charter itself (Title IV of the Home Rule Act), all require separate procedures for
adoption.
11. That Congress has not vetoed any District legislation raises the question whether
courts should assume Congress has acquiesced in this area.
12. While the Act defines "individual" to mean "all natural persons (other than
fiduciaries), whether married or unmarried," "person" is defined as "individuals, fiduciaries,
partnerships, associations, corporations, and unincorporated businesses." D.C. CODE § 47-
155 Ic (1973). Note that Congress could have prohibited taxing the personal income of any
person not a resident, which would have prohibited taxation of non-resident corporations
and unincorporated businesses. See D.C. CODE § 47-1551c(e) (1973).
13. The prohibition against taxing the "personal income" of nonresidents is the only
taxing prohibition in the Home Rule Act. Sen. Eagleton, one of the sponsors of Home Rule
legislation, said:
The present .. .council [has] jurisdiction over taxes - to whit [sic]- the real
property tax. . . . [Als to all other taxes, including franchise taxes, sales taxes,
local taxes, that jurisdiction is in Congress. We transfer the jurisdiction of taxation
to the elected City Council and the elected mayor - holding back, as I said before
- the commuter tax.
119 CONG. REC. 35,747 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton).
14. The tax was originally enacted as part of the District of Columbia Income and
Franchise Tax Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-195, 61 Stat. 331, 345 (1947), and has been a part
of the District's tax structure ever since. See D.C. CODE § 47-1574 (1973). See also note 42
infra.
15. In this Note, doing business in the District refers to the carrying on of business opera-
tions in the District or receiving revenue from sources within the District.
16. The tax extended to any unincorporated trade or business engaged in or carried on
in the District. The "professional exemption" provided:
The words "unincorporated business" do not include any trade or business which
1034 [Vol. 29:1033
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applies uniformly to businesses conducted in the District by both residents
and nonresidents. The scope of the tax had been limited, however, by a
provision of the original act exempting nonsalaried professionals and per-
sonal service businesses.' 7 In 1975, the District removed the professional
exemption to the DCUB tax, thereby taxing uniformly all enterprises do-
ing business or receiving income in the District.'8
Because it is uncertain whether, for example, fees earned by physicians
and lawyers in the District represent income to an unincorporated business
or "personal income" within the meaning of the section 602(a)5 prohibi-
tion, nonresident professionals have challenged removal of the exemption
as ultra vires. Recently, in Bishop v. District of Columbia,'9 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, en banc, held that the Council's re-
moval of the professional exemption violated section 602(a)5 of the Home
Rule Act.2" This Note will examine the evolution of the DCUB tax in
light of section '602(a)5 and the Bishop case.
I. THE DCUB TAX: INCOME OR FRANCHISE TAX?
Franchises confer rights which go beyond the rights and privileges of
citizens generally.2 ' In return for granting a franchise, the government
gains the right to impose a tax on the franchise. Probably the most com-
by law, custom, or ethics cannot be incorporated, any trade, business, or profession
which can be incorporated only under Chapter 11 of Title 29 (the Professional
Corporation Act), or any trade or business in which more than 80% of the gross
income is derived from the personal services actually rendered by the individual or
members of the partnership or other entity in the conducting or carrying on of any
trade or business, and in which capital is not a material income producing factor.
D.C. CODE § 47-1574 (1973). The reference to the Professional Corporation Act was added
by Congress in 1971. See note 103 infra.
17. See note 16 supra. It should be understood from the outset that the professional
exemption, as well as the DCUB tax itself, applies only to nonsalaried income earners (i.e.,
sole proprietors or partners). The taxation of salaried employees is not at issue, since the
District government has not attempted such a tax.
18. 22 D.C. Reg. 2091, 2113. The District may have done what Congress had previ-
ously refused to do in removing the exemption for professionals. See H.R. REP. No. 508,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
19. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2013 (D.C. Super. Ct., Oct. 18, 1977), modfied, DAILY
WASH. L. REP. 2013 (Oct. 27, 1977), rev'd 401 A.2d 955 (D.C. App. 1979), affd on rehearing
en banc, 411 A.2d 997 (D.C. App. 1980), cert. denied, No. 79-1568 (May, 1980).
20. See note 13 and accompanying text supra; notes 88-96 and accompanying text infra.
21. See, e.g., People's R.R. v. Memphis R.R., 77 U.S. 38, 50-51 (1869); In re Southern
Neb. Power Co., 109 Neb. 683, 192 N.W. 317 (1923). The "privilege" of doing business has
been cited as grounds for imposing a tax, there being no "right" recognized in common law
to do so. See Pure Oil Co. v. State, 244 Ala. 258, 12 So.2d 861 (1943); State ex rel. Short v.
Riedell, 109 Okla. 35, 233 P. 684 (1924); Philadelphia v. Samuels, 338 Pa. 321, 12 A.2d 79
(1940); In re Watson, 17 S.D. 486, 97 N.W. 463 (1903).
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mon type of franchise tax is that imposed on corporations. Doing business
in a corporate form is a right which citizens generally do not enjoy; how-
ever, corporate franchises are by no means the only type of franchise
taxed.2 2 Banking and private mail delivery services, for example, are typi-
cally subject to franchise taxes. The common thread among franchises ap-
pears to be that when an entity engages in a privileged activity, it becomes
subject to being classified and taxed on the privilege.
23
There is a wide array of methods for assessing the value of the taxed
privilege. The entity subject to a franchise tax may be assessed a flat li-
cense fee, 24 or may be taxed on the basis of either gross
25 or net income.26
When earnings or net income are taxed, the inevitable argument is that the
tax is really an income tax rather than a tax on a franchise measured by
income. Courts have done little to clarify the distinction between a
franchise tax and an income tax, stressing that the nature of the tax, judged
by its substance and effect, is controlling, and not necessarily the legislative
designation. 2 The lack of a clear distinction between the two types of
22. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of Visalia, 149 Cal. 744, 87 P. 1023 (1906)
(privilege of constructing and operating telegraph lines); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of
Boston v. State Tax Comm'n, 372 Mass. 478, 485-87, 363 N.E.2d 474, 480-81, (1977) (privi-
lege of banking); People ex rel. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Saxe, 186 A.D. 28, 174 N.Y.S. 102
(1919) (privilege of piping gas).
23. See, e.g., Mosig v. New Jersey Chiropodists, 122 N.J. Eq. 382, 385, 194 A. 248, 250
(1937) (franchises are grants that citizens cannot enjoy without legislative grant). Of course
a tax does not automatically flow from the granting of a franchise; it merely becomes a
possibility.
24. A franchise may be construed to be a license. The issue may arise when a sovereign
is granted the power to levy one type of tax but not another. See, e.g., Copt-Air, Inc. v. City
of San Diego, 15 Cal. App. 3d 984, 93 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971); People ex rel. Fitzhenry v.
Union Gas & Elec. Co., 254 Ill. 395, 398 N.E. 768, 771 (1912); Ex parte Polite, 97 Tex. Crim.
320, 323-24, 260 S.W. 1048, 1050 (1924).
25. See, e.g., State v. Boston & Portland Express Co., 100 Me. 278, 282, 61 A. 697, 698
(1905); Tri County Elec. Assoc., Inc. v. City of Gilette, 584 P.2d 995, 1001 (Wyo. 1978).
Some unincorporated business taxes are assessed on gross income. See, e.g., Foosaner v.
Dir. Div. of Taxation, 58 N.J. 57, 59-60, 275 A.2d 129, 131 (1971); Lougee v. New Mexico
Bureau of Rev. Commr's., 42 N.M. 115, 76 P.2d 6 (1937); Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah
315, 215 P.2d 616 (1950).
26. The net income taxation model is most common in corporate franchise taxation.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 47-1571 (1973). In 1890, the Supreme Court said, "[t]he validity of
the tax can in no way depend upon the mode which the State may deem fit to adopt in fixing
the amount for any year which it will exact for the franchise." Home Ins. Co. v. New York,
134 U.S. 594, 600 (1890). Unincorporated businesses are also subject to a tax on net income
in some jurisdictions. See City of Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948);
Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W. 438 (1947); Dole v.
Philadelphia, 377 Pa. 375, I1 A.2d 163 (1940).
27. See, e.g., Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries, 255 U.S. 288, 292 (1921); Commissioner
v. American Metals Co. 221 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955); New
York and Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner 168 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1948). See
1036 [Vol. 29:1033
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taxes has given rise to some unlikely consequences.
In City of Louisville v. Sebree,28 the city had imposed what purported to
be a license fee for the "privilege of engaging in Louisville in occupations,
trades, businesses, and other activities."29 The fee was assessed on the
amount of wages paid, or in the case of businesses, on net income. 30 With-
out ruling on whether this was in fact an income tax,3 1 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals construed the ordinance to impose a license fee, even though
no licenses were issued and the income of every wage earner and business
in the city was subject to tax. Although the court noted that a similar tax
had been declared an income tax in Philadelphia,32 and "a species of in-
come or excise tax" in St. Louis, 33 it regarded the operative distinction to
be the subject of the taxation, not the unit of measure. 34 Since the Louis-
ville tax was based on the privilege of doing business in the city, it was a
license fee.
Four years later, the same court came to a different conclusion regarding
the same tax in Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of Louisville v. How-
ard.35 Pursuant to congressional authorization, 36 the city was permitted to
levy local income taxes, defined as "any tax levied on, with respect to, or
note 108 infra. The mere fact that a court may refuse to accept the legislative designation
does not mean that the court will be any more adept than the legislature at defining the tax.
See, e.g., Eugene Theater Co. v. City of Eugene, 194 Or. 603, 243 P.2d 1060 (1952). See also
note 33 infra.
28. 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948).
29. Louisville, Ky., Ordinance 83. The tax was imposed pursuant to a specific grant of
legislative power to the city to raise revenue from taxes "based on income, licenses and
franchises." Ky. REv. STAT. § 91.200 (1970).
30. 308 Ky. at 424, 214 S.W.2d at 250-51. Net income for businesses included busi-
nesses conducted by individuals, partnerships, or any other entity. Id
31. Id at 428, 214 S.W.2d at 252-53. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
32. The Philadelphia unincorporated business tax, enacted in 1939, was an income tax
and a business net profits tax imposed on both residents and nonresidents. It was a model
for statutes in St. Louis and Louisville. The tax was challenged and upheld where Philadel-
phia had the charter power to exact taxes. See Dole v. City of Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 375, I1
A.2d 163 (1940). However, it was struck down in St. Louis where the statute authorized only
license taxes. See Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W. 438
(1947).
33. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W. 438 (1947). In
Cincinatti, Ohio, a similar tax was upheld as an excise tax. State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel,
99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
34. 308 Ky. at 430, 214 S.W.2d at 254. The court also considered the fact that the tax
was on net, not gross income. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky noted that in delegating
local taxing power to the city, the state legislature failed to specify a standard of measure; in
the absence of a legislative mandate, the court would not impose one. Id at 430-31, 214
S.W.2d at 254.
35. 248 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1952), afd, 249 S.W.2d 816, afrd, 344 U.S. 624, 628-29 (1953).
36. 4 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1976).
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measured by net income, gross income, or gross receipts"37 upon employ-
ees at newly annexed federal land adjacent to Louisville. The license fee
was challenged by a worker in the annexed area as a license tax rather
than a local income tax. In finding the tax an income tax, the Court of
Appeals emphasized that a tax could be construed as an excise tax within
the meaning of the Kentucky Constitution and as an income tax for fed-
eral tax purposes.38 Consequently, the improbable result of Sebree and
Howard is that the Louisville tax is a license fee for municipal purposes
and an income tax for federal purposes. On a more basic level, however,
these cases illustrate that a tax must be judged within the context of the
challenge made against it.
A. Evolution of the DCUB Tax
The District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 194739 was
the first local statute recognizing unincorporated businesses as taxable en-
tities.4° Prior to the 1947 enactment, unincorporated business income
passed directly to its partners, as in the federal taxation scheme. 4' The Act
imposed a tax "for the privilege of carrying on or engaging in any trade or
business within the District and of receiving income from sources within
the District .... ,4' The tax sought to capture revenue from businesses
that refrained from incorporating as a means of avoiding the corporate
franchise tax. Under the Act, partners conducting the business are jointly
and severally liable for payment of the tax and must file a return indicating
their distributive share of the net income, whether distributed or not.43
37. 4 U.S.C. § l10(c) (1976).
38. 248 S.W.2d at 342.
39. Pub. L. No. 80-195, ch. 258, 61 Stat. 336 (1947).
40. Id (income from unincorporated business). Previously, the states of Connecticut
and New York both had unincorporated business statutes. See note 45 and accompanying
text infra. Connecticut's unincorporated business tax applies to gross income defined as "all
receipts, whether in the form of money, credits or other valuable consideration received
during the income year in connection with any business subject to taxation under the provi-
sions of this chapter." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-270 (West 1972).
41. See note 43 infra.
42. D.C. CODE § 47-1574b (1973). The same language was used by Congress in impos-
ing a tax on corporations. Id § 47-1571 a (1973). Under the District's Revenue Act of 1937,
a general tax on the privilege of doing business was imposed at a rate of two-fifths of one
percent of gross receipts for each person, whether an "individual, firm, copartnership, joint
adventure, association, corporation. . . or other group. . . acting as a unit." Pub. L. No.
75-314, 50 Stat. 673, 688-90 (1937). This tax was repealed in 1939. Under the District of
Columbia Revenue Act of 1939, there was no tax on unincorporated businesses. Partners
were individually responsible for their pro-rata share of the partnership net income. Pub. L.
No. 76-225, ch. 367, § 25(a), 53 Stat. 1085, 1099 (1939).
43. Under I.R.C. § 701, partners rather than the partnership are taxed. This was the
1038 [Vol. 29:1033
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The 1947 Act was based upon a New York statute which also imposed a
net income tax on unincorporated businesses. 44 Both statutes exempted
professionals 45 because professionals had traditionally not incorporated
and, in fact, were not permitted to incorporate until 197 1.46 Failure to
incorporate, therefore, was not a tax avoidance scheme, as might have
been the case with other unincorporated businesses.47
Although comparison among local tax schemes is necessarily tenuous,
an examination of New York's unincorporated business tax is helpful in
understanding the nature of the DCUB tax. Like the DCUB tax, the New
York tax recognized unincorporated businesses as taxable entities and, un-
til 1966, exempted nonsalaried professionals from its operation.48 The tax
was alleged to be a franchise tax in People ex rel Froelic v. Graves,49 a case
involving a partner in an unincorporated business who sought to deduct
unincorporated business taxes from his personal return.50 Under New
scheme of the District's code. The aspect of joint and several liability distinguishes the
DCUB tax from the federal scheme which creates only several liability. Compare I.R.C. §
701 with D.C. CODE § 47-1574d (1973).
44. The law was originally enacted as a temporary measure by New York in 1935. 1935
N.Y. Laws, ch. 33, art. 16-A (currently codified at N.Y. TAX LAW § 701-23 (McKinney 1975
& 1978 Supp.).
45. The New York law specifically exempted doctors, lawyers, dentists, and "any other
profession in which capital is not a material income producing factor and in which more
than eighty per centum of the unincorporated business gross income . . . is derived from
personal services.. " N.Y. TAX LAW § 703(c) (McKinney 1975).
In 1966, New York delegated its taxing powers over unincorporated businesses to the
cities. Ch. 772, 1966 Laws of New York. Then, pursuant to express authority from the state,
New York City repealed the professional exemption. See Local Law No. 36, reprinted in
the City Rec., July 2, 1977. Removal of the exemption was upheld in Shapiro v. City of New
York, 67 Misc. 2d 1021, 325 N.Y.S.2d 787, aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 96, 196 N.E.2d 230, 343
N.Y.S.2d, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 804.
46. See D.C. CODE § 29-1101 to 29-1121 (1973 & Supp. V 1978). Interestingly enough,
unincorporated professional associations were not subjected to the DCUB tax until 1975.
See note 17 supra.
47. In urging imposition of the tax, the governor stated, "[iun my view, it is eminently
fair that a business carried on at a profit by a sole proprietor or by a group of partners
should pay a tax upon its net earnings corresponding to the franchise tax on business corpo-
rations." See Legislative Docket No. 56, 1935, 22-25 (New York). See also Thompson v.
Mealey, 290 N.Y. 230, 232, 48 N.E.2d 499, 501 (1943); Tower v. State Tax Comm'n., 282
N.Y. 407, 26 N.E.2d 955 (1940).
48. Compare D.C. CODE § 47-1574 (1973) with N.Y. TAX LAW § 703(c) (McKinney
1975). A critical distinction between New York and the District is that under New York
law, the taxation statutes are to be construed consistently with federal law. See N.Y. TAX
LAW § 702 (McKinney 1975).
49. 259 A.D. 30, 18 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1940).
50. Froelick was a partner owning 5% of the stock in a brokerage firm. He argued that
the unincorporated business tax should have been deducted by the firm before arriving at its
distributive net income upon which he would be taxed personally. 259 A.D. at 30, 18
N.Y.S.2d at 419.
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York law, a taxpayer may not deduct income taxes on his personal return
but may deduct franchise taxes.5 The New York Court of Appeals held
that unincorporated business taxes were income taxes and as such could
not be deducted on personal returns.5 2 In doing so, the court looked to the
legislative intent, New York's overall taxation scheme, and the well-estab-
lished principle that deductions are never presumed.53 Thus, at least
within the ambit of New York tax law, unincorporated business taxes are
considered to be income taxes.
B. Section 602(a)5: Prohibition of Nonresident Income Taxes
The Home Rule Act transferred Congress's taxing jurisdiction over the
District of Columbia to the City Council, with the caveat that the District
may not impose a tax on the personal income of nonresidents.54 It has
been said that this so-called "commuter tax" prohibition was the price the
District had to pay to get the Home Rule Act through Congress.55 Depriv-
ing the District government of the power to tax nonresidents was in fact a
reaction to the District's attempts, prior to Home Rule, to do just that. On
several occasions, District leaders sought congressional approval for a
commuter tax on salaried nonresident workers.56 Similarly, the District
petitioned for removal of the professional exemption from the DCUB
tax.57 Congress rejected both proposals.58 Moreover, as a result of these
initiatives, drafts of the Home Rule legislation began appearing with what
51. N.Y. TAX LAW § 360(3) (McKinney 1975).
52. 259 A.D. at 32, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
53. In contrast, Bishop argued that the DCUB tax was an income tax. See Brief for
Appellant at 12-23, District of Columbia v. Bishop, 401 A.2d 955 (D.C. 1979), affidon re-
hearing en bane No. 12871 (Feb 12, 1980). See also note 83 and accompanying text infra.
The New York court noted the high degree of integration between the unincorporated busi-
ness and the personal tax schemes. Further, the New York legislature had not designated
the tax as either a franchise or excise tax. Compare this with the congressional designation
of the DCUB as a franchise tax. Pub. L. No. 80-125, ch. 258, § 2(b)(10), 61 Stat. 336 (1947).
See also note 48 supra.
54. Home Rule Act § 602(a)5, (codified at D.C. CODE § 1-14 7 (A)5 (1973 & Supp. V
1978)).
55. See Brief for the District of Columbia on rehearing en bane at 1, District of Co-
lumbia v. Bishop, 401 A.2d 955 (D.C. 1979), af'd on rehearing en bane, 411 A.2d 997 (D.C.
1980).
The fact that Home Rule may have been held hostage by suburban legislators, who al-
lowed its passage only at the cost to the District of the commuter tax prohibition, may ex-
plain why § 602(a)(5) is in the Home Rule Act, but does not explain how it should be
construed. See note 113 infra. The District is probably right.
56. There were three separate attempts by the District in three successive Congresses,
and three dismal failures. See note 113 infra.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 508, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The District argued that pas-
sage of the District of Columbia Professional Corporation Act, D.C. CODE § 29-1101 to 29-
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eventually became section 602(a)5 of the Home Rule Act. 9 Because re-
moval of the exemption for professionals from the DCUB tax would result
in the taxation of nonresident as well as resident nonsalaried professionals
working in the District, it has been argued that section 602(a)5 was aimed
at prohibiting the repeal of the professional exemption.6" It has also been
argued that section 602(a)5 prohibits only a tax on the personal income of
salaried nonresidents.6 1
Long before the section 602(a)5 prohibition in the Home Rule Act was
even conceived, the DCUB tax was levied upon non-professional unincor-
porated businesses, including those owned by nonresidents.6 2 Like pro-
fessionals, non-professionals derive their personal income from
unincorporated businesses doing business in the District. Yet, since 1947,
these non-professionals, some of whom are nonresidents, have been sub-
ject to the DCUB tax. There were no proposals to amend the DCUB tax
when the Home Rule Act was enacted or afterwards to prohibit exaction of
the tax from nonresidents. Thus it would appear that since the passage of
the Home Rule Act, the DCUB tax has violated that Act.6 3
C. Judicial Response to the DCUB Tax
In 1949, just 2 years after the DCUB tax was enacted, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in District of Columbia v. Pickford,64
considered the nature of the tax. At issue was whether the DCUB tax was
1121 (1973 & Supp. V 1978), eliminated the reason for the exemption; therefore, the District
urged repeal of the exemption.
58. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
59. The Home Rule Act went through three drafts in the House Committee on the
District without the § 602(a)5 prohibition. The Senate bill contained the prohibition begin-
ning in 1969. See note 113 infra. See also STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Home Rule for the District of Columbia 1973-1974:
Background and Legislative History of H.R. 9056, H.R. 9682 and Related Bills 366 (Comm.
Print 1973).
60. See Supplemental Brief for Appellant Axel-Felix Kleiboemer Before the Court en
banc at 17. Congress specifically maintained the exemption when it passed the District of
Columbia Professional Corporations Act, Pub. L. 92-180, 85 Stat. 576 (1971), thus ensuring
that professionals would be taxed under neither the DCUB tax nor the corporate franchise
tax. See note 103 infra. The report stated that the exemption was necessary to avoid what is
really a commuter tax upon a group of people. H.R. REP. No. 508, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1971).
61. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 482, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1973). See note 86 and ac-
companying text infra.
62. Pub. L. No. 80-195, 61 Stat. 328 (1947). Although title VI of the Act refers to a tax
on residents and non-residents, the DCUB tax is the only portion of the 1947 Act which was
levied against nonresidents. Id at 343-45.
63. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text infra.
64. 179 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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intended to tax net income of owners of unincorporated businesses derived
from any source in the District, or only that income derived from the busi-
ness itself.65 The court held that the tax was only upon income derived
from the business. Furthermore, the court noted that the DCUB tax was
inapplicable to nonresidents' income from sources within the District.66
Thus, the court clearly distinguished unincorporated business income,
which was subject to tax, from other income, which was not.6 7
In 1957, the Maryland Court of Appeals rendered a decision much
closer to the heart of the income/franchise tax issue. In Gardella v. Comp-
troller of Maryland,68 the Maryland court considered whether DCUB
taxes paid by a Maryland resident could be credited against personal in-
come taxes due the state.69 Since Maryland grants a credit for income
taxes paid to other jurisdictions,7" the court had to consider whether the
DCUB tax was, in fact, an income tax. In finding the tax to be a franchise
tax, not an income tax, the court reasoned that it was so designated by
Congress, that it was imposed for the privilege of doing business in the
District, and that it was imposed upon the entity "unincorporated busi-
ness." 7' The court concluded that the taxpayer could claim a deduction
for the taxes paid as an ordinary business expense, but not as a tax credit.72
Subsequent to the Home Rule Act, a Virginia court considered the char-
acter of the DCUB tax. In Groom v. Forst,73 the Arlington County Court
reached a conclusion opposite that in Gardella. Subsequent to removal of
the professional exemption from the DCUB tax, the petitioner, a Virginia
65. Pickford, a nonresident, owned an apartment building from which he derived rents
and a hotel which he leased to a corporation for a percentage of the gross receipts. The
apartment rents were considered income to an unincorporated business, while the hotel rents
were not. 179 F.2d at 272.
66. Id See also Capital Holding Corp. v. District of Columbia, 374 A.2d 573 (D.C.
1977).
67. The tax is only upon work done in the District. The rules on apportioning work
between the District and other jurisdictions are set out in D.C. CODE § 47-1580 (1973 &
Supp. V 1978).
68. 213 Md. 1, 130 A.2d 752 (1957).
69. Gardella was an unincorporated partner in a retail sales store. He included all of
the income from the store in his gross income computation for his Maryland return. He then
excluded the income already subject to the DCUB tax, giving him, in effect, a tax credit for
the DCUB taxes paid. 213 Md. at 2, 130 A.2d at 752-53. See note 78 infra.
70. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 286 (1957). The Code provides that "whenever a
resident of this state has become liable . ..upon such part of his net income .. .as is
properly subject to taxation in such state" he may reduce his tax by that amount. Id. See
also note 74 and accompanying text infra.
71. 213 Md. at 2, 130 A.2d at 753.
72. 213 Md. at 3, 130 A.2d at 754.
73. Groom v. Forst, No. 18809 (Arlington County Cir., filed, March 30, 1978), afdon
rehearing mem. No. 18809 (Oct. 23, 1978) (appeal stayed pending D.C. litigation).
1042 [Vol. 29:1033
Professionals' Tax
resident working as a nonsalaried partner in a District of Columbia law
firm, became liable for payment of the DCUB tax. He paid the tax, and
like the taxpayer in Gardella, sought to claim the payment as a credit
against Virginia income taxes due, pursuant to a Virginia tax credit
scheme similar to Maryland's.7 In this case, however, the court allowed
the tax credit. The Arlington court found that to be classified as an income
tax, the tax in question had to meet the definition of an income tax used by
the federal government to determine whether taxes paid to a foreign gov-
ernment may be credited against federal income taxes due." Under the
federal test, foreign taxes are income taxes if they "seek out a net gain or
profit."76 Since the DCUB tax is one on net income, the court held that it
is an income tax and creditable on Virginia returns.
The Arlington County Court did not need to construe the DCUB tax in
light of the Home Rule Act and expressly declined to do so.77 Neither the
Maryland court in Gardella nor the Virginia court in Groom had to deter-
mine whether unincorporated business income under the DCUB tax was
personal income under section 602(a)5 of the Home Rule Act. The facts
that gave rise to the controversy, however, reveal the underlying complaint
of both professional and non-professional unincorporated owners: Vir-
ginia and Maryland residents receive a tax credit for income taxes paid to
other jurisdictions but may claim only a deduction for franchise taxes.78
The dilemma is clear: if the DCUB tax is an income tax, it is creditable
but illegal; if it is a franchise tax, it is legal but not creditable.79
74. VA. CODE § 58-151.015 (1974). While no attempt is made here to define the reason-
ing of the Arlington Circuit Court, its inconsistency with the holding in Gardella may have
some logical basis independent of the stated rationale. Virginia's tax credit statute was
amended in 1972 to allow a resident to take a credit for taxes on "earned or business in-
come." This should be compared with Maryland's credit statute. See notes 70-71 supra.
75. I.R.C. § 901(a) & (b)(l). The issue was whether the DCUB was the "substantial
equivalent" of an income tax for credit purposes. Groom v. Forst, slip op. at 4 (Arlington
County Cir., filed March 30, 1978). The Gardella court was likewise of the opinion that
federal definitions were relevant in determining the nature of the DCUB tax. See note 117
and accompanying text infra.
76. See Groom v. Forst, No. 18809, slip op. at 6 (Arlington County Cir., filed March 30,
1978). See also IRC § 901. See generally Bank of America v. United States, 459 F.2d 513
(Ct. Cl. 1972).
77. Groom v. Forst, No. 18809, slip op. at 8 (Arlington County Cir., filed March 30,
1978).
78. Compare MD. TAX CODE ANN. art. 81, § 290 (Supp. 1978) with VA. CODE §
58.151.015 (1974). There is ample evidence that if no residents had been permitted to take a
tax credit for DCUB taxes paid, the litigation never would have arisen. H.R. REP. No. 508,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
79. See Home Rule Act § 602(a)5, (codified at D.C. CODE § 1-147(c) (1973 & Supp. V
1978)) (prohibiting taxation of nonresident income without addressing franchise tax based
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II. Bishop v. District of Columbia
In Bishop v. District of Columbia,8" the District of Columbia courts con-
sidered whether the DCUB tax is a tax on personal income, thereby violat-
ing the Home Rule Act. Subsequent to the removal of the professional
exemption from the DCUB tax, the petitioner, a Virginia resident practic-
ing law in the District, paid the tax and sued for a refund in the Superior
Court for the District of Columbia.8 In addition to other arguments
raised,82 Bishop claimed that the tax was on his personal income, and that
the City Council had acted outside its authority under the Home Rule Act
by removing the professional exemption and subjecting his personal in-
come to taxation.83
The argument failed in the superior court84 where Judge Penn reasoned
on income). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 286 (1957); VA. CODE § 58-151.015. Both
Maryland and Virginia allow credits for income taxes paid to other jurisdictions.
80. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2013 (D.C. Super. Ct., Oct. 18, 1977), revisedmem. (Oct.
27, 1977), rev'd, 401 A.2d 955 (D.C. 1979), a f'd, 411 A.2d 997 (D.C. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, No. 79-1568 (May, 1980).
81. The Bishop case was not the first attack on the DCUB by a nonresident profes-
sional. An earlier case, Committee for Fair Taxation of Professionals v. District of Colum-
bia, 104 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 749 (D.C. Super. Ct., April 15, 1976), was dismissed by the
court for failure to sue in the tax division and because the Superior Court could not grant
injunctive relief. Id See D.C. CODE § 47-2410 (1973). In Virginia v. District of Columbia,
Civil No. 76-0533 (D.D.C. June 1, 1976) (motion to vacate and reconsider denied June 22,
1976), the attorney general of Virginia brought suit as parenspatriae for all Virginia non-
salaried professionals subject to the tax seeking a declaratory judgment, but the suit was
dismissed. Virginia has thus stood on both sides of the issue in Bishop, arguing that it was
an income tax in Virginia v. District of Columbia and that it was a franchise tax in Groom v.
Forst, No. 18809 (Arlington County Cir., filed March 30, 1978), aft'don rehearing mem. No.
18809, Oct. 23, 1978.
82. Petitioners also argued that the exemption was repealed without adequate notice as
required by D.C. CODE § 1-144(c) (Supp. 1978) and Council Resolution 1-1-2 (adopted Jan.
7, 1975). The District argued that notice published in the D.C. Register on March 10, 1975,
saying that the Committee on Finance and Revenue would consider "new and alternative
methods of raising revenue for the District of Columbia" was sufficient. 21 D.C. Reg. 2173
(March 10, 1975). In fact, the proposed budget did not include repeal of the professional
exemption, but did contain an overall one percent gross receipts tax. Notice of the exemp-
tion repeal did not appear until the July 11, 1975 Revenue and Finance Committee Report.
The Superior Court found this notice to be adequate. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2020.
The petitioners also argued that the DCUB violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. These arguments also
failed. Id at 2022. See generally Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 658, 665 (1975);
Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920); Travellers Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185
U.S. 364 (1902).
83. Bishop sued on his own behalf and was joined by Axel-Felix Kleiboemer, who ob-
tained class action certification for the case. The class consisted of nonresident taxpayers
who had paid the DCUB tax. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2013. The court order of Oct.
27, 1977 does not distinguish between professionals and nonprofessionals. Id at 2019.
84. Id at 2021.
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that unlike an income tax, a minimum tax is assessed upon all unincorpo-
rated businesses. s5 He also noted that the Gardella court construed the
DCUB tax to be a franchise tax, and he interpreted section 602(a)5 to pro-
hibit imposition of a "personal income tax" as that term is commonly
used.86 Thus, since the DCUB tax was a franchise tax, not an income tax,
it was valid. The court focused upon the entity taxed, recognizing a con-
gressionally intended distinction between unincorporated businesses and
individuals. Moreover, Judge Penn interpreted the legislative history of
the Home Rule Act to indicate that Congress intended section 602(a)5 to
prohibit only a personal income tax on nonresidents, not a nonresident
franchise tax.87
A three judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
disagreed, finding the District's removal of the professional exemption to
be ultra vires.8s Judge Kelly, writing for the unanimous court, adopted the
Groom rationale, distinguishing taxes on net income from those on gross
receipts. Holding that the former is properly termed an income tax and
the latter a franchise tax,89 the court interpreted section 602(a)5 to prohibit
a tax based on net income because it would tax consumable wealth, while
a tax on gross income would tax the franchise without regard to its profit-
ability.9° In observing this distinction, the court failed to consider that the
DCUB tax as amended in 1975 allowed professionals to deduct seventy
percent of their net income as a salary allowance, thereby minimizing the
85. Id The minumum tax is $25.00. D.C. CODE § 47-1574b (1973).
86. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2021.
87. Id Judge Penn cited a House Report describing § 602(a)5 as prohibiting "the im-
position of a personal income tax upon nonresidents of the District." This is in contrast to
Senator Eagleton's comment, when home rule was being debated on the House floor, that §
602(a)5 was "a specific prohibition as to the imposition of a commuter tax, a reciprocal
income tax, or any other tax on nonresidents of the District of Columbia." 117 CONG. REC.
42,498 (1971).
88. 401 A.2d 955 (1979). The panel was composed of Judges Kelly, Gallagher, and
Pair. The unanimous opinion addressed only the authority of the Council. See note 82 and
accompanying text supra. While the court held that removal of the professional exemption
was ultra vires, it did not imply that the District cannot tax nonresident professionals operat-
ing unincorporated businesses. This indeed is the most confusing aspect of the division
opinion. See note 104 and accompanying text infra.
89. 401 A.2d at 959.
90. Id at 959-60. See note 76 and accompanying text supra and note 106 and accom-
panying text infra. The court stated:
A tax on gross receipts offers a very different result. Since a gross receipts tax can
be collected even if the taxpayer has no funds remaining. . . the tax cannot be one
on personal wealth. Rather a gross receipts tax is levied for the purpose of either
taxing a privilege, such as the right to do business, or simply raising revenue, as in
the sales tax.
401 A.2d at 960. See note 104 and accompanying text infra.
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impact of the tax upon consumable wealth.9
Perhaps because of the impact of the court's holding upon future Dis-
trict finances, a majority of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia agreed to rehear the Bishop case en bane.92 On rehearing, Judge Kelly
again wrote for the majority in an eight to one decision holding the DCUB
tax in violaton of section 602(a)5.93 In this opinion, Judge Kelly stressed
the legislative history of the Home Rule Act, indicating that section
602(a)5 was expressly intended to forbid repeal of the DCUB exemption
for professionals.94 Further, the court en bane limited the reach of the
panel's earlier Bishop opinion as to the potential legality of a tax on gross
income, referring to its previous discussion as merely "an illustrative de-
vice."9 5 In so doing, the future of the DCUB tax in any form is left open to
doubt,9 6 and further litigation would appear inevitable.
Dissenting, Judge Mack viewed the issue not as whether the Home Rule
Act prohibited the Council's repeal of the professional exemption, but
rather whether unincorporated professionals constituted business entities
for tax purposes.9 7 She saw "no reason in law or logic" why a professional
91. D.C. CODE § 47-1557b(a)(15)(A) (1973 & Supp. V 1978). The percentage deductible
by owners as a salary allowance has undergone several changes. When professionals were
exempt from the tax, the allowance was 20% of net income. D.C. CODE § 47-1557b(a)(15)
(1973). After passage of the Revenue Act of 1975, the City Council raised the allowance to
55%. 22 D.C. Reg. 2547 (Nov. 13, 1975). Then, while repeal of the Revenue Act was being
considered in the House, and, in light of H.R. 9471, which would have not only raised the
salary allowance to 80%, but also would have removed the income exclusion feature avail-
able only to District residents, the Council agreed to compromise. It agreed to a 70% allow-
ance for profesionals, but reduced the allowance for non-professional unincorporated
owners to 30%. D.C. CODE § 47-1557b(a)(15) (1973 & Supp. V 1978). Undoubtedly the
argument that the tax is one on personal income would have been much stronger had the
Council retained the 20% salary allowance.
92. 401 A.2d at 962. The en bane court also vacated the opinion of the three-judge
panel pending the rehearing en bane. Id
93. Appeal docketed, No. 12871 (D.C., Feb. 12, 1980) (en banc).
94. Bishop v. District of Columbia, No. 12871, slip op. at 6 (D.C. 1980). In the three-
judge panel opinion, Judge Kelly similarly found that § 602(a)5 was intended to prohibit a
commuter tax. Judge Kelly sought to distinguish the DCUB tax from the corporate
franchise tax. She noted that "if there is a sufficient nexus between that individual and the
jurisdiction, such as a corporation which does business exclusively within the jurisdiction,
then the tax is no longer a commuter tax. For that and other obvious reasons, a commuter
tax could be levied only on natural persons." 401 A.2d at 958 n.9. This kind of acute
reasoning was not extended to unincorporated businesses, even though they are no more
natural persons than are corporations.
95. Bishop v. District of Columbia, No. 12871, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1979). See
note 90 supra.
96. See note 110 infra. At present, the District is still undecided on whether to attempt
collection of the tax against nonresident shareholders in professional corporations. See note
112 infra.
97. Bishop v. District of Columbia, No. 12871, slip op. at 9 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1979). This
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doing business in the District is not an entity that can be made subject to a
franchise tax.9 8 Regarding the DCUB tax as a franchise tax, not an in-
come tax, Judge Mack found application of the tax to nonresidents within
the District's authority under the Home Rule Act. The problem with the
majority's holding, she noted, was that it removed the tax from nonresi-
dent professionals but continued to tax resident professionals, making the
DCUB tax vulnerable on consititutional grounds.99 Judge Mack's opinion
quite accurately predicts an administrative nightmare in the wake of the
opinion. o
III. TOWARD AN EQUITABLE TAXING SCHEME: REPEAL OF THE
PROFESSIONAL EXEMPTION TO THE DCUB TAX
A. Alternative Interpretations of the Bishop case
L The Court of Appeals en banc
The decision of the court of appeals en banc in Bishop raises many ques-
tions about the validity of the DCUB tax in light of secton 602(a)5 of the
Home Rule Act. These questions stem, in part, from alternative classifica-
tion schemes used by Congress and the District in drafting legislation.
The local tax scheme in the District of Columbia distinguishes between
salaried and nonsalaried income earners.' 0 ' Prior to 1975, the DCUB tax
had distinguished between professionals and non-professionals. °2 The
Home Rule Act distinguishes between residents and nonresidents. Al-
though repeal of the professional exemption occasioned the challenge, the
foundation of the Bishop challenge lies in the Home Rule Act's resi-
dent/nonresident distinction. Thus, if the DCUB tax violates section
602(a)5, it does so with respect to all nonresidents, both professionals and
non-professionals working in the District. The court's opinion grants relief
view presumes that unincorporated businesses are separate taxable entities and that the
DCUB is a franchise tax measured by net income. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text
infra.
98. Id. at 9-10.
99. Id. at 12. The Professional Corporation Act, D.C. CODE § 29-1101 to 29-1121 (1973
& Supp. V 1978), eliminated the rationale for the professional exemption. See note 103
infra. Since 1971, therefore, this tax has been vulnerable on Equal Protection grounds.
100. The District must decide whether to continue to collect the tax against nonresident
non-professionals, resident professionals, and nonresident shareholders in professional cor-
porations. Moreover, the District must refund taxes paid by nonresident professionals since
1975, estimated at approximately 58 million dollars. See Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1980, § A, at
1; see note 103 supra.
101. See D.C. CODE § 47-1574 (1973).
102. D.C. CODE § 47-1502a (1973). The income tax applies only to residents; the busi-
ness franchise taxes apply to residents and nonresidents. D.C. CODE § 47-1567 (1973).
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only to the class of nonresident professionals which Bishop represented.
Nonresident non-professionals and resident professionals - two classes
that remain subject to the tax - have compelling arguments that will un-
doubtedly be litigated in the near future.
Resident professionals can argue that although they must compete on an
equal footing with nonresident professionals working in the District and
derive the same benefits from the District government as their nonresident
counterparts, they alone are subject to the DCUB tax.
Similarly, nonresident non-professionals can argue that there is no rea-
soned basis for taxing them while exempting nonresident professionals.
The effect of the court of appeals en banc decision in Bishop is to reinstate
the professional exemption for nonresident professionals. A substantial el-
ement in the former rationale for the exemption no longer exists, however,
because professionals have been able since 1971 to incorporate in the Dis-
trict."°3 Thus, the absence of a viable rationale for the exemption again
raises strong equal protection arguments.
2. The Three Judge Panel
In the earlier decision in Bishop, the three judge panel focused on the
DCUB tax as a tax on net rather than on gross income, thus determining
that it was an income tax.1°4 However, the distinction between taxes on
gross and net income is an artificial one. It is true that there is an estab-
lished body of federal case law making this distinction on the creditability
of foreign taxes.'" 5 This case law, however, is of little value in construing a
local statute such as section 602(a)5 prohibiting taxes on "personal in-
come."
The court of appeals en bane apparently recognized the weakness of the
three judge panel's decision. In endorsing a gross income tax and prohibit-
ing a net income tax, the panel failed to address the issue of whether the
103. District of Columbia Professional Corporations Act, Pub. L. No. 92-180, 85 Stat.
576 (1971) (codified at D.C. CODE § 29-1101 to 29-1121 (1973 & Supp. V 1978)). With
removal of the professional exemption from the DCUB tax, the Council amended the Pro-
fessional Corporations Act to include a tax on professional corporations and unincorporated
businesses. See D.C. CODE § 29-1121 (Supp. V 1978). The Bishop opinion leaves the Dis-
trict vulnerable to a suit under the Equal Protection Clause.
104. It is ironic that this distinction would be used to invalidate the tax. In its initial
consideration of the Revenue Act of 1975, the City Council examined a 1% overall gross
receipts tax, but abandoned it in favor of removing the professional exemption. See Pro-
posed Budget, 21 D.C. Reg. 2359, 2372. See also notes 42 & 90 supra.
105. See, e.g., New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d
745 (2d Cir. 1948); Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894, 897 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943).
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DCUB tax was a tax on personal income. This may explain why the court
converted what was essentially the rationale for the earlier holding in
Bishop into mere dicta.' 6 But in so doing, the court left open the question
of what other tax measures are permissible.
0 7
Moreover, the panel identified "unincorporated businesses" as the taxa-
ble entities, thus eliminating the need to consider that Congress enacted
the DCUB tax as a franchise tax.' This differentiation supports the prop-
osition that references to federal income tax definitions, regulations, and
rulings in construing local taxes are often inappropriate.0 9 Finally, by
reasoning that the DCUB tax is one on net income, the three judge panel
side-stepped the main issue of the case: whether a tax on net income is
necessarily a tax on personal income within the meaning of the section
602(a)5 prohibition." 0
3. The Superior Court
The superior court, on the other hand, correctly acknowledged that the
language of section 602(a)5 was the crux of the issue in Bishop. In under-
standing the term "a personal income tax" as that term is "commonly
used,"' " Judge Penn failed to address the definitional problem at the
heart of the controversy: the scope of the section 602(a)5 prohibition. Al-
106. See note 90 and accompanying text supra. Using the federal foreign tax credit anal-
ysis, the court concluded that taxes on gross income are taxes on franchises or other privi-
leges, while taxes on net income are income taxes. Bishop v. District of Columbia, 401 A.2d
at 959. See note 74 supra. This was the premise that enabled the court to conclude that the
DCUB tax was an income tax.
107. See notes 129-31 and accompanying text infra.
108. Pub. L. No. 80-195, 61 Stat. 343, 346 (1947). One trend in the law considers legisla-
tive clarification as irrelevant in determining the nature of the tax. See, e.g., Dawson v.
Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288, 292 (1921); Commissioner v. Ameri-
can Metal Co., 221 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955). An alternative
view gives great weight to legislative classification of taxes. See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S. 107, 145 (1910); County Comm'rs v. English, 182 Md. 514, 531, 35 A.2d 135,
143 (1943).
109. Reference to federal definitions may have been appropriate in Groom v. Forst, No.
18809 (Arlington County Cir., filed March 30, 1978), because the Virginia tax scheme relies
upon federal tax definitions. The Bishop court, however, lost sight of the fact that in con-
struing the DCUB tax it was construing a local tax statute that did not depend on federal tax
law as do some state tax statutes. See [1979] ALL STATES TAX GUIDE (P-H) 221.
110. The court fails to support this conclusion. For example, corporate income taxes are
frequently considered to be corporate franchise taxes based on net income. The court's con-
clusion that a tax on net income is a tax on personal income begs the question. See 401 A.2d
at 961. See generall, Lever Bros. Co. v. District of Columbia, 204 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
1 A. COOLEY, TAXATION 49 (4th ed. 1903).
111. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2021. Judge Kelly was satisfied that § 602(a)5 prohib-
ited a personal income tax but not a franchise tax based on income. See note 87 supra.
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though the statute obviously attempts to avoid allowing a commuter tax,
the scope and extent of the commuter tax ban remain issues in need of
judicial interpretation.'
1 2
The District attempted to have a reciprocal income tax enacted in three
sessions of Congress prior to home rule. 13 Simultaneously, the District
was also seeking removal of the professional exemption to the DCUB tax.
In refusing to remove the exemption, it has been argued that Congress
viewed maintaining the professional exemption in the DCUB tax as neces-
sary to avoid imposing what would be, in effect, a commuter tax.
114
On the other hand, there is no evidence in the legislative history of the
Home Rule Act that Congress ever conceived of the DCUB tax, which was
then taxing nonresident nonprofessionals, as running afoul of the section
602(a)5 prohibition." 5 Moreover, pursuant to the Home Rule Act, Con-
gress is given thirty days to veto Council legislative action." 6 After hear-
ing extensive debate on the same issues raised by the Bishop case, the
House Committee on the District of Columbia decided not to object to the
Council's removal of the professional exemption." 7 Therefore, if Con-
112. Bishop v. District of Columbia, No. 12871, slip op. at 13 (D.C. 1980). No one on
either side of the debate doubts that § 602(a)5 prohibits a commuter tax, but neither side can
agree on what constitutes a commuter tax for the purposes of § 602(a)5. See note 87 supra.
The strongest argument that the intent of § 602(a)5 was to preserve the professional exemp-
tion in the DCUB tax can be found in the legislative history of the Professional Corpora-
tions Act. See note 114 and accompanying text infra.
113. In 1967, Rep. Minchall introduced a bill that would have imposed a flat 2% tax on
wages. H.R. 7473, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). It failed. In 1968, the District unsuccessfully
attempted to remove the professional exemption from the DCUB tax and change its
designation to a "business income" tax to enable nonresidents to avail themselves of the
credit provisions of their home state statutes. See H.R. 16361, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 202
(1968). In 1969, the proposals from 1967 and 1968 were put together but were defeated with
no small amount of help from suburban congressmen. See Revenue Proposals: Hearings
before the House Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See
also notes 70 & 74 supra.
114. H.R. REP. No. 508, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971). See note 60 supra. Interestingly,
reference to a commuter tax ban as prohibiting repeal of the professional exemption appears
in the legislative history of the Professional Corporations Act of 1971, but nowhere in the
legislative history of the Home Rule Act.
115. The exemption was preserved in the Professional Corporation Act by Congress.
See D.C. CODE § 47-1574 (1973). The vitality of the exemption may indicate the lobbying
strength of nonresident professionals on Capital Hill at the time the Professional Corpora-
tion Act was passed. See Bishop v. District of Columbia, 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2021
("petitioners overlook the fact that the exemption was merely granted by way of legislative
grace.").
116. Home Rule Act § 602(c)l, (codified at D.C. CODE § 1-147(c)1 (1973 & Supp. V
1978)). See also note 11 supra.
117. See Subcommittee on FiscalAffairs of the Comm. on the District of Columbia- Hear-
ings and Disposition on H. Con. Res. 370, to disapprove the Revenue Act of 1975, and H.R.
9471, to amend the District of Columbia tax laws applicable to unincorporated business in-
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gress intended section 602(a)5 to prohibit repeal of the professional exemp-
tion to the DCUB tax, it is difficult to understand why it failed to act in the
face of the Council's action doing just that.
B. Implementing an Equitable Tax Scheme
Nonresidents may justifiably complain about paying taxes to the District
in that they have no voting representation on the City Council. Congress,
however, showed little concern for the problem of taxation without repre-
sentation when, in 1947, it authorized taxing nonresident, non-professional
unincorporated businesses in the DCUB tax. 1 8 Nonetheless, any inequi-
ties created by the DCUB classification system were resolved in 1975 when
the City Council removed the professional exemption." 9 The combined
effect of secton 602(a)5 and what is left of the DCUB tax results in an
inequitable distribution of the local tax burden. Under the current ar-
rangement, professional unincorporated business owners who reside
outside the District are not subject to the DCUB tax, but nonprofessional
nonresidents are taxed.' z0 This distinction may cause patent inequities.
For example, in a given hypothetical unincorporated District law firm, a
senior partner living in Virginia will not be subject to the DCUB tax, while
the senior partner living in the District will be subject to the tax. Further,
the unincorporated supplier of office furniture for the firm living in Vir-
ginia will pay the DCUB tax, but the law firm's salaried junior associate
living in the District will not. An arrangement as dizzying as this bears
only the most tenuous relationship to the value of city services actually
consumed, or to the ability of the entity taxed to pay - two rationales
most often advanced for taxing nonresident workers.
Even nonresident professionals have conceded that they are inequitably
benefited by the Bishop decision and, as an alternative, have advocated a
reciprocal income tax.' 2 ' A reciprocal income tax would apply to all sala-
come, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Congressional Veto Hearings].
Congress did not reserve for itself line-item veto power over the Council's budget. Thus,
Congress would have had to veto the entire budget for it to exercise its veto power over the
removal of the exemption.
118. Pub. L. No. 80-195, 61 Stat. 331 (1947). The Supreme Court has rejected the argu-
ment that a state may not tax nonresidents who earn income within its borders. See Travis
v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
119. An obvious inequity was created when Congress preserved the professional exemp-
tion in the DCUB tax while enacting the Professional Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 92-180,
85 Stat. 576 (1971), thereby removing the only rationalization for the exemption. See note
103 and accompanying text supra.
120. This is because Bishop only represented the class of nonresident professionals. See
note 96 supra.
121. See Hearings and Markup of .R. 11579 and H. R 14621 Before Subcomm. on Fiscal
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nied and nonsalaried individuals working in the District but residing else-
where. These workers would pay an income tax to the District and credit
the amount paid on their home state returns.12 2 An obvious disadvantage
of such a scheme, often cited by legislators from Maryland and Virginia, is
that income taxes paid by their residents to the District would result in less
tax revenue to their respective states. Thus, areas of Maryland and Vir-
ginia outside the Washington metropolitan region would be required, in
effect, to subsidize the District, while commuters reap the benefits. 2 3 As
an alternative, neighboring Congressmen have proposed increasing the
federal payment to the District.124 This solution, in addition to being ad-
ministratively burdensome, essentially leaves the District's finances in the
hands of Congress, depriving the District of the autonomy purportedly
granted by Home Rule.'25
Since a reciprocal income tax may be politically impossible, 26 or at
least undesirable, District officials must examine other taxing alternatives
in light of Bishop and section 602(a)5. The District is one of the few juris-
dictions recognizing an unincorporated business as a taxable entity.127 In
failing to exempt nonresidents from the DCUB tax when it passed section
602(a)5, Congress implicitly chose not to recognize unincorporated busi-
ness income as personal income. For a court to deny the District a taxing
power that Congress apparently approved, and to do so in unequivocal
terms, 28 constitutes judicial interventionism warranted by neither section
602(a)5 nor by the facts of the Bishop case. Further, if section 602(a)5 is to
Affairs and the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 476-78 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Commuter Tax Hearings] (statement of Dr. Shuford, Pres. of District of
Columbia Dental Society, and Mr. Daniel, Pres. of District of Columbia Bar). See also id,
at 483-84 (statement of Ben Fischer, past Pres., Federal Communications Bar Ass'n).
122. This is assuming the reciprocal income tax would pass both Maryland and Vir-
ginia's tax credit statutes. See note 74 supra. The state of Virginia has estimated its revenue
loss from a reciprocal income tax in the District at 21 million dollars per year as of 1978. See
Commuter Tax Hearings, supra note 121, at 265. Maryland estimates its yearly loss at 25
million dollars. Id at 179.
123. Id
124. See 1975 Congrissional Veto Hearings, supra note 117, at 196 (statement of Hon. N.
Steers state Sen. - Md.) and 228 (statement of Cong. Harris - Va.). This solution is discussed
in Washington Post, March 2, 1980 § A, at I.
125. See id.
126. See Commuter Tax Hearings, supra note 121. "Even the most ardent advocates for
the city know that this Congress is not going to pass a commuter tax. . . . I am at a loss to
explain why we are here today holding these hearings." Id at 11 (remarks of Rep. Gude -
Md.).
127. The New York Unincorporated Business Tax, for example, will be phased out in
1982, with the proviso that the cities may retain it. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 701 (McKinney
1975).
128. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
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stand as an absolute bar to nonresident taxation, as the court has implied,
more than the DCUB tax has been brought into question. 29 The broad
consequences flowing from the court's interpretation of section 602(a)5 in
Bishop suggest that Congress never intended "personal income" to have
such a far-reaching and potentially destructive meaning. After Bishop, the
District will have to examine closely any new revenue scheme.1 30  Al-
though the District will waste no time finding some other way to tap reve-
nue from nonresidents working in the District, 3 ' the success of such
efforts is highly speculative in light of the convoluted logic of the court of
appeals in Bishop v. District of Columbia.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the Home Rule Act, Congress conferred sweeping powers on the Dis-
trict government, with certain important caveats. One key power withheld
was the right to tax the personal income of nonresident workers. The ex-
tent of this reservation, however, is ambiguous. In Bishop v. District of
Columbia, the court of appeals en bane construed the prohibition very
broadly. In finding the application of the DCUB tax to nonresident non-
salaried professionals to be a violation of section 602(a)5 of the Home
Rule Act, the court raised more questions than it answered. Not only has
the applicability of the DCUB tax to nonresident non-professionals and
resident professionals become unclear, but other District taxes affecting
nonresidents' personal income may soon be challenged. In future opinions
interpreting section 602(a)5, courts should seek to narrow the broad and
uncertain contruction rendered in Bishop v. District of Columbia.
Charles Butler
129. See District of Columbia v. Bishop, Petition for Certiorari at 8. All taxes, except
perhaps the real property tax, in some indirect way apply to nonresidents when they attach
to goods rather than to individuals.
130. The Court of Appeals has created a trap for the unwary. Each revenue package the
District enacts will now be subject to the uncertainties of enormous potential liability.
131. See Washington Post, March 7, 1980 § A, at 1.
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